Truth

Pascal Engel offers this concise presentation and discussion of contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth. After a brief presentation of the classical conceptions of truth (correspondentist, coherentist, verificationist and pragmatist) the study focuses upon the debate between those who favour substantive conceptions of this classical kind and those who advocate so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions, and who deny that truth can be any more than a thin concept, carrying no metaphysical weight. The author argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as it is claimed by some upholders of radical deflationist views. It is argued, in particular, that some deflationist views have a definitely relativist and postmodernist ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysical substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, the author argues, truth can keep a central role within our thinking, as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices, in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.