Deontology, Responsibility, and Equality

Three questions that loom large in moral and political philosophy are these: Can deontological moral constraints be justified? When, if ever, are we morally responsible for what we do? How is the ideal of equality best configured? 'Deontology, Responsibility and Equality' deals with selected aspects of these three broad questions. It discusses critically certain attempts by Frances Kamm and Thomas Nagel (among others) to account for the impermissibility of minimising violations in terms of moral status. Also, it challenges the view that there is a morally relevant difference between doing and allowing harm and, especially, between killing and letting die. In relation to the second question, it concentrates on recent developments within compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility prompted by the work of Harry Frankfurt. It challenges his purported refutation of the principle of alternative possibilities as well as certain positive compatibilist, identification-based accounts of responsibility. Finally, with respect to the last question, the book focuses on how we should understand the ideal of equality of opportunity and the moral significance of the distinction between social and natural inequalities. It defends equality of outcome over equality of opportunity and the view that natural inequalities are, if bad, no less bad than social inequalities. This book has been accepted at the University of Copenhagen for a public defence as a Dr Phil dissertation.